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Introduction
Whether they are line managers, human resource management
staff, or organizational psychologists, managers of human resources
must make decisions (e.g., hiring, placement, training,
compensation, performance appraisal, feedback, etc.) in which
theories of human work behavior play an important role. I/O
psychologists (and other social scientists) find the organizational
environment a rich source of information for advancing knowledge
and testing theories about employment relationships, their
antecedents and consequences. Applied research articles inevitably
discuss "practical implications," but what is the real value of
human resource productivity improvement programs?
The Human Resource Management (HRM) functions of industrial
organizations typically lack the influence and visibility of the
more "traditional" management functions (such as marketing, finance,
operations and accounting). Journals for HRM professionals
routinely lament the slow progress of organizations in implementing
programs that have gained wide acceptance by scientists (cf. Jain
& Murray, 1984). Journals and books routinely admonish and instruct
the HRM professional to "sell" their programs by emphasizing their
effects on organizational goal attainment (Bolda, 1985; Gow, 1985;
Jain & Murray, 1984; Sheppeck & Cohen, 1985). Indeed, the question
of whether the HRM function contributes to corporate profit is
still important enough to merit recent discussion in a widely-cited
professional journal (Gow, 1985). It is difficult to imagine such
a debate regarding the Finance, Marketing, Accounting, or
Engineering departments. Is the contribution of I-a psychology
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and other social sciences to human resource management really so
intangible compared to these other management functions?
Utility analysis involves describing, predicting and explaining
the usefulness or desirability of decision options, and analyzing
how that information can be used in decision making. In I/O
psychology, the term utility analysis has become associated with
a specific set of models that reflect the consequences (usually
performance-related consequences, such as output as sold, sales,
net benefits, or reduced costs) of programs (e.g., selection,
recruitment, training, performance feedback, goal setting,
compensation, internal staffing and turnover control) to enhance
work force productivity. Utility analysis offers a method for
better understanding the role of I/O psychology and other social
sciences in improving HRM decisions and organizational performance.
Moreover, it offers an invitation to I/O psychologists and other
social scientists to adopt a truly interdisciplinary approach to
important scientific and practical questions.
A Conceptual Framework
Selection utility models can present very complex algebraic
and statistical formulas, but their basic concepts are quite
logical, simple, and direct.
Selection Utility Analysis Supports Decisions
Selection Utility models are "decision aids" (Edwards, 1977;
Einhorn & McCoach, 1977; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz, 1977;
Fischer, 1976; Huber, 1980; Keeney& Raiffa, 1976), tools for
predicting, explaining, describing and analyzing decisions.
Decision aids assist decision makers in overcoming limited cognitive
capacity ("limits on rationality"according to March & Simon, 1958)
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by providing a consistent and structured framework within which
to compare decision options. Selection utility models offer a
consistent structured framework for considering selection
consequences, and for communicating those consequences to
constituencies in generally-understood units (e.g., dollars).
Applying selection utility analysis models requires: (1) a
set of decision options to be considered (e.g., two or more
different selection systems); (2) a set of attributes reflecting
the characteristics of the options that affect valued outcomes
(e.g., validity coefficients, costs, effect sizes, quantity of
employees affected), combined with a "utility scale" that reflects
the value of each attribute level to the decision maker (e.g.,
a scale translating selection validity into dollar-valued
performance); and (3) a payoff function, the weighting scheme or
other combination rule reflecting the relationships among the
attributes in estimating total utility for each option (e.g., an
algebraic formula describing the relationship between validity,
cost and utility).
Viewing selection utility models as decision tools is quite
consistent with their historical development, as will be discussed
subsequently. Yet, little research has addressed whether they
have any effect on actual decisions. Throughout this chapter,
I will propose that selection utility research must proceed with
a keen awareness of the decisions it is designed to support, and
that such an awareness suggests some very different research
questions and directions from those currently being pursued.
The Unit of Analysis: Human Resource Productivity Improvement
Programs
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The options considered by utility analysis models are human
resource productivity improvement programs. Such programs are
combinations of activities (or procedures governing activities)
that affect the organizational value of the work force.
Decisions about individuals versus decisions about programs.
As Cronbach and GIeser (1965, p. 9) noted, utility analysis is
most appropriate for programs that will be applied to many
individuals over time. Thus, programs embody procedures, rules
or "strategies" (Cronbach & GIeser, 1965, p. 19) intended to be
applied to many individuals. Selection utility analysis typically
focuses on programs using tests to select new employees. Such
programs involve rules indicating how the test is to be applied
to applicants, and how the test results are to be used in choosing
among applicants.
A distinctive feature of "programs" is that they affect many
decisions about individuals. The selection program, for example,
will affect hiring decisions for many applicants. Selection
programs work by providing information that causes certain
applicants to be hired who otherwise might have been rejected (and
vice versa), resulting in a more productive group of hires than
would be possible without the test. The decision about each
applicant, however, is not the focus of selection utility analysis.
Rather, it is the decision to implement a program that will alter
the way many applicants are evaluated for hiring. Because such
decisions affect many individuals throughout their tenure with
the organization, the impact of even a single program decision
on future work force consequences can be quite large, as we shall
see.
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The organization context. Selection programs "work" if they
increase the correctness of those choices in ways that are important
enough to offset the costs of the information. However, each
organization or decision maker will define importance differently,
depending on the constituents involved, the way it employs employee
productivity, and how selection interacts with other programs such
as compensation and training. Research has often proceeded as
if these factors are held constant, but more integrative future
research should examine these relationships more explicitly.
Three Basic Utility Analysis Variables: Quantity, Quality and Cost
Selection utility models can be expressed in terms of three
basic attributes (Boudreau, 1984, 1987, in press a, in press b;
Boudreau & Berger, 1985a, 1985b): (1) Quantity, reflecting the
quantity of employees and time periods affected by program
consequences; (2) Quality, reflecting the consequences (per person,
per time period) associated with the program; and (3) Cost,
reflecting the resources required to implement and maintain the
program. The payoff from a selection program can be derived by
taking the product of Quantity and Quality, and then subtracting
Cost. Generally, the program exhibiting the largest positive
difference is preferable.
Selection utility models differ in the manner in which they define
each of these three variables, but they all can be understood within
this framework.
Historical Development
Selection utility analysis models responded to the inadequacies
of traditional measurement and test theory in expressing the
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usefulness of tests. As Cronbach and GIeser (1965. pp. 135-136)
stated:
The traditional theory views the test as a measuring
instrument intended to assign accurate numerical values
to some quantitative attribute of the individual. It
therefore stresses. as the prime value. precision of
measurement and estimation. In practical testing.
however. a quantitative estimate is not the real
desideratum. A choice between two or more discrete
treatments must be made. The tester is to allocate each
person to the proper category. and accuracy of measurement
is valuable only insofar as it aids in this qualitative
decision. ... Measurement theory appears suitable without
modification when the scale is considered in the abstract.
without reference to any particular application. As
soon as the scale is intended for use in a restricted
context. that context influences our evaluation of the
scale.
Therefore. the history of selection utility analysis will
be discussed from a decision-making perspective. focusing on each
model's definition of "goodness". and using the concepts of
Quantity. Quality and Cost to assess the decision value of each
historical development.
Defining Payoff with the Validity Coefficient
Model description. The validity coefficient (the correlation
between a predictor measure and some criterion measure of subsequent
behavior. usually expressed as
~) is the attribute of selection
that has the longest history. The correlation coefficient and
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indexes derived from it (e.g., the index of forecasting efficiency
and coefficient of determination, Hull, 1928) lead to the conclusion
that only relatively large differences in the validity coefficient
produce important differences in the value of a test.
Evaluation from a decision-theory perspective. As indicators
of a test's usefulness for decisions, such formulas are quite
deficient. First, the implied payoff function is unrealistic.
The correlation coefficient measures squared deviations from a
predicted linear function, treating any deviation of the predicted
value from the linear function as equally undesirable.
Overpredicting the best candidate's future performance is treated
as equivalent to underpredicting it, yet the former is unlikely
to cause serious decision errors, while the latter easily could.
In terms of the three basic program attributes (i.e., quantity,
quality and cost), correlation-based models reflect neither the
quantity of time periods affected by the selection decisions nor
the quantity of employees affected in each time period. They
provide only indirect evidence of the predictor's effect on work
force quality. Finally, they fail to acknowledge the fact that
developing and applying selection programs entails costs.
Defining Payoff Based on the Success Ratio
Model description. The "success ratio" represents the
percentage of selected individuals who are successful on the job.
According to the Taylor-Russell (1939) tables, when other parameters
are held constant: (1) higher validities result in more improved
success ratios (because the more linear the relationship, the
smaller the area of the distribution lying in the false-positive
or false-negative region); (2) lower selection ratios result in
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more improved success ratios (because the lower the selection ratio,
the more "choosy" is the selection decision, and the predictor
scores of selectees lie closer to the upper tail of the predictor
distribution); (3) base rates closer to .50 result in more improved
success ratios because valid selection has less value as you
approach a base rate of zero (where none of the applicants can
be successful) or as you approach a base rate of 1.0 (where all
applicants can succeed even without selection).
Evaluation from a decision-making perspective. Regarding
the payoff function, a dichotomous criterion (i.e., selectees are
either satisfactory or unsatisfactory) will often lose information
because the value of performance is not equal at all points above
the satisfactory level, nor at all points below the unsatisfactory
level (Cascio, 1982, p. 135; Hunter & Schmidt, 1982, p. 235,
Cronbach & GIeser, 1965, pp. 123-124, 138). The more typical
(though not uniformly applicable) situation is where performance
differences within the two groups exist. Under such situations,
a continuous criterion would be more appropriate. Still, the
Taylor-Russell model may provide adequate decision support for
some situations. Cascio (1982, p. 146) suggests it may be more
appropriate for truly dichotomous criteria (e.g., turnover
occurrences), or where output differences above the acceptable
level do not change benefits (e.g., clerical or technician's tasks),
or where such differences are unmeasurable (e.g., nursing, teaching,
credit counseling). In terms of the three program attributes
(i.e., quantity, quality and cost), the Taylor-Russell model (like
its predecessors) ignores both the quantity of employees affected
and the number of time periods during which that effect will last.
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The model does a better job of describing the change in quality
produced by the program (in that it provides some idea of increased
success probabilities), but this quality measure must be interpreted
differently from situation to situation. Finally, the Taylor-
Russell model completely ignores costs.
Defining Payoff Based on the Standardized Criterion Level
Model description. The major criticism of the success ratio
was that it's dichotomous criterion failed to reflect the true
variation in performance. The next version of the selection utility
model attempted to remedy this by defining a continuous criterion
as the payoff function. Brogden (1946a, 1946b) used the principles
of linear regression to demonstrate the relationship between the
correlation coefficient and increases in a criterion (measured
on a continuous scale).
Assuming a linear relationship between criterion scores and
predictor scores, if we derived the best, linear, unbiased estimate
of the change in standardized criterion scores (Z ) corresponding
~
to a change in standardized predictor scores (Z ) in the applicant
~
population, the linear prediction equation would be:
Z =
~
(~) (~ (1)
Therefore, if we knew the average standardized predictor score
of a selected group of applicants (i.e., Zx)' our best prediction
of the average standardized criterion score of the selected group
(i.e., Z ) would be the product of the validity coefficient and
~
the standardized predictor score, as shown in Equation 2.
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Z =
~
(r HZ)
~~
(2)
This utility model reflects a continuous criterion (expressed in
standardized, ~-score units) as its payoff function, and includes
as attributes both the validity coefficient (in the population
of applicants to which the predictor will be applied) and the
average standardized predictor score of those applicants chosen.
The validity coefficient and its derivation were well established,
and Naylor and Shine (1965) computed extensive tables showing,
for each selection ratio, the corresponding average standardized
predictor score (assuming normally distributed predictor scores
and top-down applicant selection).
Evaluation from a decision-making perspective. This utility
model addresses one shortcoming of the Taylor-Russell model by
defining payoff based on a continuous criterion. However, because
the criterion is expressed in standard-score units, it is difficult
to interpret in units more natural to the decision process (e.g.,
dollars, units produced, reduced costs, etc.). Also, this payoff
function reflects only the difference between the average
standardized criterion score of those selected using the predictor
and the average standardized criterion score that would be obtained
through selection without the predictor (the mean of the applicant
population which, by definition, has a standard score of zero).
The total utility from the program is not computed, only the
increment over not using the predictor.
Considering the three basic utility model concepts (i.e.,
quantity, quality and cost), the quantity of employees and time
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periods are not reflected, the quality criterion is in statistical
rather than tangible units, and the cost of the selection program
is still omitted.
Defining Payoff in Terms of Dollar-Valued Criterion Levels
Model description. The most obvious drawback of using
standardized criterion levels as the payoff function is that they
are difficult to interpret in "real" units. Selection device
development and implementation activities are often expressed as
costs (i.e., required uses of resources), usually scaled in dollars.
With a standardized criterion scale, one must ask questions such
as: "Is it worth spending $10,000 to select 50 people per year,
in order to obtain a criterion level .5 standard deviations greater
than what we would obtain without the predictor?" Obviously, many
HRM managers may not even be familiar with the concept of a standard
deviation. Almost certainly, they would find it difficult to attach
a dollar value to a .5 standard deviation increase in the criterion
(especially considering that the decision makers may never actually
observe the appropriate population for that standard deviation-
-the population of applicants to which the predictor would be
applied)
.
Both Brogden (1946a, 1946b, 1949) and Cronbach and GIeser
(1965, pp. 308-309) eventually derived their utility formulas in
terms of "payoff", rather than standardized criterion scores.
They also both included the concept of costs. Thus, they originated
the notion of expressing utility on a dollar-valued scale. To
accomplish this, they introduced a scaling factor that translated
standardized criterion levels into dollar terms, and they added
a term for the costs of the selection program. The scaling factor
Selection Utility Analysis Page 12
is simply the dollar value of a one-standard-deviation difference
in criterion level (symbolized in various ways, including
~
,
<I"::.
'~ ~
and SD , the latter being used here). The cost factor is usually
-z.
expressed as the cost to administer the predictor to a single
applicant (usually symbolized as ~. Finally, the utility value
is symbolized as AU, to indicate that it represents the difference
between the dollar payoff from selection without the predictor
and the dollar payoff from selection with the predictor (this is
usually called the "incremental" utility of the predictor). The
resulting utility Equation may be written as Equation 3.
Au = (SD Hr HZ)
-~ ~ ~
£!SR (3)
The per-applicant cost (~ is divided by the selection ratio (SR)
to reflect total cost of obtaining each selectee (e.g., if the
selection ratio is .50, then one must test 2 applicants to find
each selectee, and the testing cost per selectee is 2 times the
cost per applicant).
Thus, Equation 3 depicts the incremental dollar-valued
criterion level of those selected with a predictor (~, in a
population of applicants where the validity coefficient is r .
~'
where a one-standard-deviation difference in criterion levels equals
SDy; where the average standardized predictor score of those
selected is equal to Z ; and the per-selectee cost of using the
-;c
predictor is (£!SR). To express the total gain from using the
predictor to select N selectees, we simply multiply the benefits
-B
by the number selected, change the symbol for incremental utility
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from
~
~U t04U, and multiply the per-applicant cost by the number
of applicants (N ) as shown in Equation 4.
~
A!!. = (N )(SD )(r )(2)
~-~~~
(C)(N )
- ~
(4)
Cronbach and GIeser (1965, p. 39) also recommended computing the
difference in utility between two tests, which simply involves
substituting the difference in validities for r and the
~
difference in costs for C in Equations 3 and 4.
Finally, to incorporate the duration of the effects of better-
selecting one employee cohort, Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie & Muldrow
(1979) multiplied the benefit component of these models by the
expected tenure of the hired cohort (i.e., !).
Evaluation from a decision making perspective. Scaling the
per-person, per-time-period incremental criterion level in dollars
seems more in keeping with organizational objectives to increase
dollar prof! ts . The B-C-G utility model incorporates a scaling
factor (SD ) to translate standardized criterion levels into
-~
dollars. Measuring SD has proven controversial as will be
-~
discussed subsequently.
The B-C-G model incorporates the three basic selection utility
analysis components (i.e., quantity, quality and cost). Quantity
is incorporated in the number selected and their average tenure.
Quality is incorporated in the product of
~'
Z~, and SDy
(producing the per-person, per-time-period incremental do11ar-
Selection Utility Analysis Page 14
valued criterion level). Costs to develop and implement the
selection program are contained in the cost factor (£).
Encouraging more widespread selection utility analysis
applications. The B-C-G utility model remained largely unnoticed
by I/O psychologists (at least in terms of published research
studies), though this model represented a fundamental and important
alternative to traditional measurement theory as a framework for
I/O psychology research. The reasons for this lack of attention
are unclear. It is likely that the algebraic complexity of these
models proved daunting to managers, so researchers may have
encountered difficulty communicating the purpose and importance
of the models. Moreover, researchers may have incorrectly assumed
that all model parameters must be fairly accurately measured to
apply the models because the aim was to produce a point estimate
of utility. This misconception still exists today, as discussed
subsequently.
Hunter & Schmidt (1982) and Schmidt, et ale (1979) noted the
limited application of the B-C-G models and proposed that three
widely-held misconceptions might explain it: (1) The belief that
utility equations are of no value unless the data exactly fit the
linear homoscedastic model, and all marginal distributions are
normal (in fact, the B-C-G model only introduces the normality
assumption for "derivational convenience," Hunter & Schmidt, 1982,
p. 243, as it provides an exact relationship between the selection
ratio and the average standard test score of selectees); (2) The
belief that test validities are situationally specific, making
application of utility analysis possible only when a criterion-
related validity study has been performed in the particular
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situation (in fact, "validity generalization," Hunter, Schmidt,
& Jackson, 1982a research suggests that much of the variability
in validity coefficients observed across studies is due to artifacts
of the studies rather than real differences in the predictor-
criterion relationship); (3) the belief that the parameter scaling
standardized values into dollars (i.e., SD ) is difficult or
-~
impossible to measure. A later section will discuss this
measurement issue in detail.
Financial/Economic Factors: Utility Analysis as an Investment
Model
The dollar-valued payoff model led to speculation that
selection utility could provide a link between Personnel/HRM
research and the more traditional management functions (Landy,
Farr & Jacobs, 1982, p. 38; Cascio and Silbey, 1979). Recent
research suggested enhancements to the traditional selection utility
model designed to incorporate financial and economic considerations
into the analysis. Boudreau (1983a) suggested that by measuring
utility with a payoff function reflecting sales or "the value of
output as sold," researchers were probably overstating HRM program
effects on after-tax profit (the payoff scale used for financial
investments). He showed how the utility formulas could easily
be altered to account for three basic financial/economic concepts:
variable costs, taxes and discounting.
First, "sales (or service) value" (i.e., the change in sales
revenue or output as sold) differs from "service cost" (i.e., the
change in organizational costs associated with changed service
value), which differs from "net benefits" (i.e., the difference
between service value and service costs) produced by an HRM
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intervention. HRM programs that improve sales value can require
additional support costs (e.g., increased inventories to support
higher sales, increased raw materials usage to support higher output
volumes, increased salaries/benefits as incentives for improved
performance). Moreover, many interventions operate not by
increasing sales revenue or output levels, but by reducing costs
(e.g., Florin-Thuma & Boudreau, in press). Boudreau (1983a)
included the effects of HRM programs on service costs by multiplying
the incremental service value increase by a proportion (~
reflecting the change in net benefits per change in sales value.
Second, most organizations pay taxes on income to Federal, State
and Local governments. Thus, pre-tax net benefits and costs may
be overstated when they fail to account for increased taxes.
Boudreau proposed multiplying both the net benefits and the
implementation costs (~ by one minus the applicable tax rate (i.e.,
I-TAX) to reflect after-tax effects. Third, returns can often
be invested to earn interest. A dollar received in the future
is worth less than a dollar received today, because the latter
can earn interest in future periods. Boudreau demonstrated how
the interest rate earned on program returns (i.e., !) could be
incorporated into the selection utility analysis model.
Boudreau proposed that by incorporating these financial
adjustments, reported utility values would better reflect the
economic realities of organizations, would be more comparable to
investment values reported for programs in other management
functions, and might be more credible to managers accustomed to
working with financial analysis. Cronshaw and Alexander (1985)
also argued for HRM programs as financial investments, suggesting
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that "a major reason for the differential success of human resource
and financial managers in implementing their respective evaluation
models is the greater rapprochement of capital budgeting with the
everyday language of line managers and with the financial planning
needs of the organization" (p. 102).
The Employee Flows Utility Model
To move beyond selection utility models reflecting only the
consequences of hiring one group of employees, Boudreau (1983b)
proposed the "employee flows" model. Organizations seldom invest
in a selection program to use it once and then stop. Rather they
can continuously reapply the program as new members enter the
workforce. To analyze only the first-cohort effects is tantamount
to analyzing an investment in new manufacturing facilities based
on only one production run. Clearly, such a focus omits a large
part of the decision's effects.
Boudreau proposed that a more accurate approach would reflect
the number of "treated" (i.e., better-selected) employees in the
i h f i d (i N ), and the costs incurredwork force n eac uture per 0 .e.,
~
to select the employees joining the work force in each future time
period (i.e., ~). Boudreau acknowledged that any of the utility
variables could change over time, and noted that the "flows" model
could reflect such temporal changes. The flows model highlighted
the importance of the Quantity concept (the number of employees
and time periods affected by the intervention) in explaining the
potentially huge effects of human resource management decisions.
To illustrate the effects of employee flows, Boudreau used
data from the Schmidt, et al. (1979) study. However, whereas the
earlier authors had computed quantity by multiplying the size of
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the first selected cohort (i.e., 618) by its expected tenure (i.e.,
approximately 10 years), Boudreau assumed that each cohort of 618
selected employees remained on the job for 10 years, and then left
to be replaced by a newly-hired cohort. The effect of these
assumptions was that the number of better-selected employees in
the workforce steadily rose (by 618 per year) during the first
10 years (as new.employees were added to the workforce and joined
previously-selected employees), until it reached 6,180. For the
next five years, vacancies created by the separation of
systematically-selected employees were filled with systematically-
selected employees, so the number of treated employees in the work
force remained at 6,180. When the program was terminated, the
number of treated employees in the work force slowly diminished
(by 618 each year) until it reached zero. Boudreau used an analysis
period of 25 years (i.e., the program was applied for 15 years
and then stopped).
Using the one-cohort model, Schmidt, et al. proposed that
the effects of improved selection would affect 6,180 person-years
of productivity (i.e., 10 years average tenure times 618 hired
employees). Using the employee flows model, Boudreau calculated
that the program would affect 92,700 person-years of productivity
(i.e., the sum of
~
over all 25 years). This is a critically
important point. Repeated application of improved selection
programs can affect huge numbers of employee-years of productivity
producing massive potential productivity effects. The key to
understanding this is to recognize that HRM programs are likely
to be re-applied over time, rather than applied only once. Just
as one would not attempt to justify a million-dollar investment
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in a new manufacturing plant based only on the first production
run, HRM decision makers should not attempt to justify investments
in HRM programs based only on the first cohort affected.
Integrating Employee Recruitment Into Selection Utility Analysis
Boudreau and Rynes (1985) noted that while the early Taylor-
Russell selection utility model explicitly included the "base rate"
(i.e., the proportion of applicants whose performance would exceed
minimally acceptable levels if randomly selected), the majority
of selection utility research was conducted under the implicit
or explicit assumption that all selection options would be
implemented within the same applicant population.
Two factors may make such assumptions simplistic compared
to organizational reality. First, as Boudreau and Rynes (1985)
noted, common wisdom in the recruitment literature suggests that
more rigorous or intrusive selection methods may affect the size
and/or characteristics of applicant pools (though there is little
research to support or refute this suggestion). Second, recruitment
strategies (e.g., personalized follow-ups, realistic job previews,
choices of recruitment sources) are explicitly designed to alter
applicant population characteristics, presumably to enhance
organizational outcomes.
Boudreau and Rynes proposed that every parameter of the utility
model could be affected by recruitment strategies, or could be
affected by applicant reactions to selection devices. For example,
applicant populations might be more homogeneous (reducing both
SD and the correlation coefficient) if more stringent standards
-r.
were applied to recruitment sources. Higher salary offers might
increase the size and perhaps the qualifications of the applicant
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pool (affecting both the selection ratio and the average
qualification level of the population). In the Boudreau-Rynes
model, utility values are represented on an absolute scale,
reflecting both the average and the incremental value of the
selectees. They demonstrated how the incremental selection utility
model alone may severely understate the combined value of integrated
recruitment and selection, and how improved base rates may actually
offset reductions in selection effectiveness caused by restrictions
in range or smaller applicant pools.
The State of the Art in Empirical Research:
Utility Values for Selection Programs
I recently reviewed empirical studies through 1986, with
utility values for 39 interventions. The unavoidable conclusion
is that selection programs payoff handsomely. Virtually every
study has produced dollar-valued payoffs that clearly exceeded
costs. Studies dealing with many employees and multiple-year tenure
can produce utility values as high as $20 to $30 million (e.g.,
Schmidt, et al., 1979; Cascio & Ramos, 1986). The clear positive
payoff from selection programs remains evident in studies with
relatively small SD values as well as in studies with large SD
~ -¥-
values, and with selection ratios as high as 50%. As would be
expected, the largest utility values result in studies where large
numbers of individuals are affected by the program (i.e., where
N is large).
-s
Many of the studies were designed to examine whether
substituting a more-valid selection method for a less-valid one
(usually in interview) produced greater dollar-valued payoff (Burke
& Frederick, 1985; Cascio & Ramos, 1986; Cascio & Silbey, 1979;
Ledvinka, Simonet, Neiner & Kruse, 1983; Schmidt, et al., 1979;
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Schmidt, Mack & Hunter, 1984; Rich & Boudreau, 1987). In every
case the more valid (and usually more costly) selection procedure
produced the greater utility.
Utility values as measured by the B-C-G model appear to be
quite high. Moreover, the measured costs of improved selection
are usually minuscule compared to the benefits. Such a conclusion
seem inconsistent with the ongoing debate over whether human
resource management's contribution is ignored, whether HRM issues
should be considered in organizational planning, and whether HRM
programs represent appropriate uses for organizational resources.
The State of the Art In Empirical Research:
Measuring the Standard Deviation of Performance in Dollars
The standard deviation of dollar-valued job performance in
the applicant population (SD ) was characterized as the "Achilles'
-~
Heel" of utility analysis by Cronbach and GIeser (1965, p. 121).
The large amount of recent research aimed at better estimating
this elusive concept suggests that many of today's selection utility
researchers agree, and regard accurate measurement of SD as a
-~
fundamental requirement for useful selection utility analysis
research (Burke & Frederick, 1984, 1985; Weekley, O'Connor, Frank
& Peters, 1985). I located 26 studies, with over 100 individual
SDy estimates. The trend in research activity is evident, with
only 5 studies between 1953 and 1979 and 21 studies between 1979
and 1986.
Effects of Setting
A wide variety of occupations has been examined, with the
choice of occupation usually determined by whatever research setting
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presented itself to the researchers. Jobs where workers exercise
more discretion regarding the quantity and quality of production
and/or where variation in production has large implications for
organizational goals should exhibit higher SDy values than jobs
without these characteristics, assuming the same variability in
skill and motivation in each work force. Of course, different
jobs probably face different ranges of skill and motivation among
job incumbents, which could cause even jobs of high discretion
and importance to produce lower observed SDy values than jobs
without those characteristics. Most SDy studies focused on only
one job, making across-job comparisons difficult (because jobs,
measurement methods, settings and time periods are confounded).
In studies of more than one job (Wroten, 1984; Eaton, Wing & Lau,
1985), but results suggested the SD estimation method affected
-r.
whether cross-job differences were observed.
Every SD study used job titles to identify employees holding
-r.
similar job duties and tasks. Such an approach may inadvertently
include across-job differences in the SDy measure. For example,
although computer programmers may all hold the same job title,
certain programming jobs may involve primarily transcribing
flowcharts into computer code, while other programming jobs may
involve designing the logic of the program (Rich & Boudreau, 1987).
Clearly the latter job has more potential for both valuable positive
contributions and/or costly mistakes. If the selection test will
be used primarily to select programmers assigned as coders, this
will overstate SDy (and vice versa). Moreover, if jobs with
different titles actually share duties, this could explain the
lack of consistent job-to-job differences.
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Effects of Payoff Scales
The most general definition of payoff for utility analysis
is "all consequences of a given decision that concern the person
making the decision (or the institution he represents)" (Cronbach
& GIeser, 1965, p. 22). Payoff measures should reflect different
outcomes (e.g., productivity increases, labor cost reductions,
affirmative action goal attainment, improved organization image,
consistency with fundamental organizational beliefs, high levels
of financial return, etc.) in different decision situations,
consistent with the objectives of decision makers (see Cronbach
& GIeser, 1965, p. 23). The payoff scales used in selection utility
analysis research focus on the consequences of increased labor
force quality, so the payoff from improved selection depends heavily
upon how the quality enhancements caused by such programs will
be used.
Three general uses for improved labor force quality are:
(1) raising the quantity of production; (2) raising the quality
of production; and (3) reducing production costs. Managers may
use labor force quality increases in any or all of these ways,
or may combine them. A payoff scale defined in terms of profit
can reflect any or all of these uses. Payoff scales reflecting
only quantity or quality or cost may fail to reflect the two omitted
uses. Payoff scales reflecting revenue enhancements (through higher
quality or quantity) and cost reductions dominate the selection
utility literature, though profit-based scales are emerging.
Payoff as cost reduction. Most of the earliest selection
utility analysis applications focused on cost reduction as the
salient outcome of improved selection. Doppelt and Bennett (1953)
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focused on reductions in training costs. Van Naersson (1963)
focused on reductions in driving accident and training costs.
Lee and Booth (1974) and Schmidt & Hoffman (1973) focused on reduced
costs of replacing separations. More recently, Eaton, Wing &
Mitchell (1985) measured payoff in terms of the avoided costs of
additional tanks, and Schmidt and Hunter (1983) noted that increased
work force productivity might reduce "payroll costs" by producing
the same amount of output with a smaller number of employees (p.
413)
.
Arnold, Rauschenberger, Soubel & Guion (1983) adopted the
premise that improved selection would allow hiring fewer employees
to do an equivalent amount of work. These payoff functions are
also consistent with the "behavioral costing" approach to HRM
program analysis described by Cascio (1982). While cost reductions
often offer a highly visible and salient payoff function in
situations where cost reduction is the dominant consideration,
its deficiencies have led researchers to explore further options.
Payoff as the "value of output as sold". Schmidt, et a1.
(1979) measured SD in terms of the "yearly value of products and
-r.
services", and the "cost of having an outside firm provide these
products." Hunter and Schmidt (1982, pp. 268-269) interpreted
the payoff function as the value of "output as sold," or what the
employer "charges the customer." Most research has focused on
similar payoff scales (Bobko, Karren & parkington, 1983; Bolda,
1985; Burke & Frederick, 1984, 1985; Cascio, 1982; Cascio & Ramos,
1986; Cascio & Silbey, 1979; Eaton, Wing & Lau, 1985; Eaton, Wing
& Mitchell, 1985; Eulberg, O'Connor & Peters, 1985; Ledvinka, et
al., 1983; Mathieu & Leonard, 1986; Reilly & Smither, 1985; Schmidt,
et al., 1984; Weekley, et al., 1985; Wroten, 1984). The "sales
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value" payoff scale reflects the increased revenue generated by
employees as a result of the program, but it may be a deficient
payoff definition. When organizational investments are evaluated
based on profit contribution, evaluating selection investments
based only on revenue contribution may artificially inflate
selection utility values.
Payoff as increased profits. The initial attention to the
payoff function for utility analysis proceeded from the notion
that the payoff scale should be applicable to business decisions,
and generalizable across business organizations. This suggests
defining payoff as the contribution to organizational profits.
Brogden and Taylor (1950) proposed the "dollar criterion" reflecting
the sales revenue generated when a product is sold, less any
production costs. Cronbach and GIeser (1965) provided a very
general payoff concept, including all consequences important to
decision makers. Thus, their payoff concept is consistent with
a "profit" definition, though it can encompass even broader
definitions. Only one study actually adopted a payoff function
reflecting profit contribution (Reilly & Smither, 1985), with
results suggesting that the graduate students in their simulation
differed most in their SD estimates when they were asked to
-~
consider "net revenue" rather then "new sales," or "overall worth".
Similarly, Bobko, et al. (1983) found that sales counselor
supervisors exhibited much more variable SD estimates when
-~
attempting to estimate "yearly value to the company" rather than
"total yearly dollar sales."
Although costs, sales and profits have enjoyed someSummary.
attention as payoff functions, any payoff function should be judged
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on its ability to improve decision quality or better describe,
predict and explain decisions. All existing payoff scales reflect
a concern with productivity-based outcomes, virtually ignoring
other consequences of selection decisions (e.g., community
relations, work force attitudes, adherence to a code of ethics).
Every payoff function will be deficient in some way, so the
fundamental consideration is how the organization will use such
quality improvements (i.e., increasing revenue versus reducing
costs versus increasing profit). The typical research approach
of comparing SD estimates based on different payoff functions
-~
fails to reflect this fundamental decision context. Future research
should focus on how productivity improvements are actually used
so that the payoff function better reflects the actual decision.
Effects of the Focus Population
Virtually all SD estimates are based on the incumbent
-~
population (e.g., Bobko, et al., 1983; Burke & Frederick, 1985;
Cascio & Silbey, 1979; Eaton, Wing & Mitchell, 1985; Janz &
Dunnette, 1977; Schmidt, et al., 1979; Schmidt & Hunter, 1983;
Wroten, 1984), probably because the incumbent population is most
familiar to job supervisors. However, the incumbent population
is not technically the appropriate population of interest. For
selection utility, the appropriate population is the applicant
population to which selection procedures will be applied. This
population may differ from the incumbent population for a number
of reasons.
First, if certain procedures (for example, promoting out the
best performers and dismissing the worst performers) make the
incumbent population a restricted sample of applicant job
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performance (Schmidt, et al., 1979), then SD estimated on job
-l.
incumbents will be downward-biased. Second, applicant population
changes over time due to different recruitment procedures or labor
market influences (Becker, 1985; Boudreau & Rynes, 1985) may operate
either to increase or decrease performance variability, and make
applicant SD levels either higher or lower than SD among job
-~ -~
incumbents. Third, estimating SD on job incumbents encourages
-l.
estimators to consider all of the incumbents they have had
experience with, including incumbents with different tenure levels.
If performance varies with tenure, then SD estimated on the
-l.
incumbents will reflect this tenure variability. However, this
variability will not be present among cohorts of selectees because
each cohort of hired applicants will have equal tenure throughout
their employment. Thus, where job tenure and performance are
related, an SD estimate based on job incumbents may overestimate
-l.
applicant SDy. Fourth, as noted earlier, virtually all utility
analysis research groups employees with similar job titles to form
the focus population. However, if task assignments or work
environments differ within the same job the variability of
performance may differ as well. SD estimates based on incumbent
-~
populations may be inaccurate reflections of the actual SD in
-l.
the selection system (Bobko, et al., 1983 and Rich & Boudreau,
1987 discuss this issue).
Most authors who discuss this issue adopt the argument that
incumbent-based SD estimates are conservative due to restricted
-l.
range. However, there is as yet no evidence regarding the possible
biasing effects of variability due to tenure, different recruiting
approaches, or different labor market conditions. Indeed, not
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one study has compared SD estimates based on the applicant
-~
population to those based on the incumbent population.
Effects of Measurement Technique
Because SD was characterized as the Achilles' Heel of utility
-~
analysis by Cronbach and GIeser (1965) and because differences
in SD can cause such large differences in total utility estimates,
-~
many have argued that it is important to develop better SD
~
measures. Though variations on each theme are prevalent, it is
possible to divide SD measurement methods into four categories:
-~
(1) Cost accounting, (2) Global estimation, (3) Individualized
estimation, and (4) Proportional rules.
Cost accounting. These methods use accounting techniques
to attach a value to units of performance or output for each
individual, with the standard deviation of these individual
performance values representing SD (e.g., Roche, 1961; Van
-~
Naersson, 1963; Schmidt & Hoffman, 1973; Lee & Booth, 1973). The
difficulty and arbitrariness of cost accounting has frequently
been cited as arguing in favor of simpler methods (e.g., Cascio,
1982; Cascio & Ramos, 1986; Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; Schmidt, et
a1., 1979).
Global estimation. These methods have experts estimate the
total yearly dollar-valued performance at two, three, or four
percentiles of an hypothetical performance distribution, with
average differences between these percentile estimates representing
SD (e.g., Bobko, et al., 1983; Bolda, 1985; Burke & Frederick,
~
1984, 1985; Cascio & Silbey, 1979; Eaton, Wing, & Lau, 1985; Eaton,
Wing & Mitchell, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; Mathieu & Leonard,
1986; Rich & Boudreau, 1987; Schmidt, et al., 1979; Schmidt, Mack
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& Hunter, 1984; Weekley, et al., 1985; Wroten, 1984). Subjects
often find the task difficult, refuse to do it, or produce high
inter-rater variance (e.g., Bobko, et al., 1983; Mathieu & Leonard,
1987; Rich & Boudreau, 1987; Reilly & Smither, 1985). Providing
a common 50th percentile anchor can reduce inter-rater variability
as can consensus ratings (Burke & Frederick, 1984; Wroten, 1984)
but this makes SDy dependent on the anchor (Bobko, et al., 1983;
Schmidt, Mack & Hunter, 1984; Wroten, 1984), violating the
statistical assumption of independence between the mean and the
standard deviation.
Only limited evidence exists on the accuracy of global SDy
estimation, and tests are usually based on arguably deficient
objective performance measures. Bobko, et al. (1983) found that
the actual distribution of sales revenue (number of policies sold
times average policy value) for sales counselors was normally
distributed, and that the SD estimate based on the averaged
-~
difference between the 85th and 50th and the 50th and 15th
percentiles was not significantly different from the actual sales
distribution (although the percentile estimates were quite
different). However, when respondents were asked to consider the
"overall worth of products and services" and "what you would pay
an outside organization to provide them," the values were only
about one-tenth the actual sales standard deviation, and apparently
anchored on pay levels rather then sales. Burke and Frederick
(1984) also found SD estimates of overall worth were lower (about
-r-
one-percent of the actual sales standard deviations), and anchored
on various activities including sales. Reilly and Smither (1986)
found that graduate students participating in a business simulation
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(who had been provided with data to estimate actual standard
deviations) produced global SD estimates slightly higher than
-~
the simulation information (for repeat sales and new sales) and
much higher than the simulation for net revenue. The SD estimate
-~
of overall worth was 49% of actual repeat sales, 3.45 times actual
new sales, and 1.92 times actual net revenue. Thus, the research
is sparse and the results are mixed, providing little evidence
that global SD estimates reflect actual sales or productivity
-~
information.
Individualized estimation. This method translates some
measurable characteristic of each individual in the sample (e.g.,
pay, sales activity, performance ratings) into dollars using a
scaling factor such as average salary or average sales, with the
standard deviation of these values representing SD (e.g., Arnold,
-~
et al., 1982; Bobko, et al., 1983; Burke & Frederick, 1984; Cascio
& Ramos, 1986; Dunnette, Rosse, Houston, Hough, Toquam, Lammlein,
King, Bosshardt, & Keyes, 1982; Eulberg, O'Connor & Peters, 1985;
Janz & Dunnette, 1974; Ledvinka, et al., 1983; Reilly & Smither,
1985). Three individualized estimation techniques have emerged.
First, Cascio (1982) and Cascio & Ramos (1986) used CREPID
(Cascio-Ramos Estimate of Performance In Dollars). This method
breaks a job into important "principal activities." Then, each
activity is rated on four dimensions (time/frequency, level of
difficulty, importance, and consequence of error), and the ratings
multiplied to give an overall weight to the activity. The
proportion of total weights becomes the final importance weight
assigned to each activity. To assign a dollar value to each
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activity, average salary for the job is divided among the activities
according to the proportional importance weights. After this "job
analysis" phase, supervisors are asked to rate employees'
performance on each principal activity, using a 0 to 2 scale.
To translate these ratings into dollars, they are multiplied by
the dollar value assigned to that activity. After each employee
has been assigned a dollar value for each activity; these activity
values are summed to provide the total dollar value of yearly
performance for that employee.
Janz & Dunnette (1977) proposed a second technique. Their
approach also involves identifying critical job activities.
However, rather than allocating salary to each activity based on
its time/frequency, importance, etc., the Janz and Dunnette
procedure requires job experts to estimate the "relative dollar
costs associated with different levels of effectiveness on each
of the various job performance dimensions" (p. 120), by tracing
the consequences of the various levels of effectiveness to determine
their impact on activities to which costs and/or value can be
attached.
A third approach to individualized estimation involves having
experts simply assign dollar values to individual employees
directly. Bobko, et al. (1983) used this method to derive an SD
-Y..
estimate based on sales levels (sales volume times average insurance
policy value), with each person's yearly sales representing the
individual value estimate. Burke and Frederick (1984) also used
individual sales levels. Wroten (1984) adopted a similar approach,
but did not have sales data available. He simply asked his
supervisors to provide a direct estimate of the yearly dollar value
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of each employee's performance. Ledvinka, et ale (1983) used total
payroll plus benefits divided by the number of insurance claims
as the value per claim, and then multiplied this value by the actual
standard deviation of claims processed.
Individualized estimation has the advantage of assigning a
specific value to each employee that can be explicitly examined
and analyzed for its appropriateness. Such analysis might be useful
in determining which individual attributes contribute to differences
in judgments. Methods involving behavioral job analysis (e.g.,
CREPID or Janz-Dunnette) may be more understandable or credible
to those familiar with the job, though absolutely no evidence exists
on this issue. Still, each method makes certain basic assumptions
regarding the nature of payoff. CREPID is based on the assumption
that the average wage equals average productivity, a position not
supported by economic theory and clearly violated in organizations
with tenure-based pay systems, pay systems based on rank, and many
hourly-based pay systems. Sales-based measures are based on the
assumption that sales captures sufficient performance differences
to be useful (an assumption that may omit important job tasks,
such as training, that reduce an individual's sales but increase
the group's sales). Janz-Dunnette is based on the assumption that
job behavior effects on costs and revenues can be accurately traced
by managers. Individualized estimation methods are often more
complex, costly and time consuming than other estimation methods,
and as yet no evidence suggests whether they improve decisions.
Proportional rules. This measurement approach multiplies
some available productivity-related variable (e.g., average wage,
average sales, average productivity value) by a proportion to
a job by some proportion (e.g., between 40% and 70%) to derive
the SD estimate for the incumbent employee group.
-~
Hunter and Schmidt (1982, pp. 257-258) reviewed empirical
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estimate SD (e.g., Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; Schmidt & Hunter, 1983;,
-~
Eaton, Wing & Lau, 1985; Weekley, et al., 1985; Cascio & Ramos,
1986; Eulberg, et al., 1985; Mathieu & Leonard, 1986). Proportional
rules emerged in part from observations concerning the relationship
between SD estimates and average salary levels, and in part from
-~
the desire to provide a straightforward SD measurement method
-~
that could be used even when the global estimation procedure is
not feasible. The method involves multiplying average salary in
studies and compared their SD estimates to reported or derived
-~
average salary levels. They discovered that SD averaged about
-~
16% of average salary. The authors also reviewed two of their
own studies (using a global estimation procedure) and noted that
SD was 60% of annual salary in one study of budget analysts and
-~
55% of annual salary in another study of computer programmers.
They estimated that "the true average for SD falls somewhere in
-l.
the range of 40 to 70% [of average salary]" (p. 258). They also
reviewed empirical data on productivity levels measured in units
of output. Their review indicated that for non-piece-rate
situations the average ratio of the standard deviation to the mean
productivity was .185, while in piece-rate situations the average
ratio was .150, and in uncertain compensation systems the average
ratio was .215. They concluded that "researchers examining the
utility of personnel programs such as selection and training can
estimate the standard deviation of employee output at 20% of mean
output without fear of overstatement",and that "the findings of
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this study provide support for the practice that we have recommended
of estimating SD as 40% of mean salary" (p. 412).
-~
The proportional rules proposed by Schmidt and Hunter are
intriguing because they suggest that simple SD estimation may
-~
be quite feasible in virtually all situations. However, this
simplification is obtained by assuming that average salary is indeed
equal to about half the value of the average value of products
"as sold", which may be violated by tenure-based pay systems,
negotiated pay systems, labor market conditions such as
unemployment, and internal labor markets (e.g., Becker, 1964).
One must also assume that SD is equal to about 20% of the average
-~
value of products "as sold", which was not the case in a number
of the studies reviewed by Schmidt and Hunter (1983).
My review of utility studies through 1986 uncovered 17 SD
-~
estimates below 40% of salary, 18 estimates within the 40% to 70%
range, and 29 estimates above 70% of salary. No SD estimates
-~
fell below 20% of mean output, 9 fell between 23% and 34%, and
27 fell above 34% (many of these were quite substantially above
34%, some as high as 100% or more). While these results support
the conservatism of this decision rule, it should be noted that
a detailed meta-analysis has not been conducted. Moreover, the
.
results suggest that using the Hunter-Schmidt proportional rule
may produce such conservative estimates that severely understated
utility estimates and rejection of potentially useful HRM programs
might result.
Summary. Existing research suggests that differences between
SD estimates using different methods are often less than 50% (and
-r.
may be less than $5,000 in many cases). However, it is tempting
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to consider the fact that these differences may be multiplied by
factors of hundreds or thousands in deriving the final total utility
value. Even a small difference multiplied by such large values
can imply vast total utility differences, tempting some to conclude
that we need substantially more research on SD measurement to
-~
whittle down such differences and provide more precise total utility
estimates. However, carefully considering the role of uncertainty
in selection utility tempers this conclusion.
The Role of Uncertainty and Risk in Utility Analysis
How is it that selection utility analysis research can
simultaneously produce such clear evidence of program payoff (i.e.,
virtually every study showed positive and often quite large utility
values) and such a raging debate on the proper measurement method
for one utility parameter (SD )?
-~
One explanation is that although
the expected utility values are quite high, there is also
substantial uncertainty associated with these utility estimates,
and that uncertainty stems largely from measurement error in SD .
-~
Properly investigating this issue requires changing the focus of
utility analysis from attempting to develop the most accurate
estimate of expected utility to attempting to estimate both the
expected value and the distribution of values (Boudreau, 1984;
Rich & Boudreau, 1987). It focuses attention away from measurement
and toward uncertainty and risk in the decision situation.
Four Alternative Approaches for Estimating Uncertainty
Rich and Boudreau (1987) provided a conceptual framework for
uncertainty in utility analysis and empirically applied of four
alternative methods to account for uncertainty: (1) sensitivity
analysis; (2) break-even analysis, (3) algebraic derivation of
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utility value distributions; and (4) Monte Carlo simulation
analysis.
Sensitivity analysis. Several utility analysis applications
have addressed possible variability in utility parameters through
sensitivity analysis (e.g., Boudreau, 1983a, 1983b; Boudreau &
Berger, 1985a; Cascio & Silbey, 1979; Florin-Thuma & Boudreau,
1987; Schmidt, et al., 1979; Schmidt, et al., 1984). Sensitivity
analysis varies each of the utility parameters from its lowest
to its highest value, holding other parameter values constant.
The utility estimates resulting from each combination of parameter
values are examined to determine which parameters' variability
has the greatest effect. A variant of sensitivity analysis involves
attempting to be as "conservative" as possible in making utility
estimates. This approach has led researchers to produce clearly
understated SDy values (Arnold, et al., 1982), or to estimate the
95% confidence interval surrounding the mean SD value and use
-l.
the value at the bottom of this interval in the utility computations
(e.g., Schmidt, et al., 1979; Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; Schmidt,
et a!., 1984). If resulting utility values remain positive in
spite of such conservatism, it is presumed that they will turn
out to be positive in the actual application.
Though valuable, sensitivity analysis usually provides no
information about the effects of simultaneous changes in several
utility parameters (though Boudreau & Berger, 1985a and Boudreau,
1987 expressed the effects of simultaneous changes in utility
parameters) and provides no information regarding the utility value
distribution nor the probabilities associated with particular
parameter value combinations (Hillier, 1963, p. 444). Set ting
Selection Utility Analysis Page 37
all parameters at their most conservative levels (a statistically
unlikely event) risks incorrectly concluding that some programs
will not payoff.
Break-even analysis. Boudreau (1984) proposed that a
relatively simple uncertainty analysis could be carried out by
calculating the lowest value of any individual utility parameter
(or parameter combination) that would still yield a positive total
utility value. These parameter values were termed "break-even"
values because they represent the values at which the HRM program's
benefits are equal ("even with") the program's costs. Any parameter
values exceeding the break-even value would produce positive total
utility values, and vice versa. Such logic is well-known in micro-
economic theory and financial management (i.e., Bierman, Bonini
& Hausman, 1981). Boudreau showed that such analysis was useful
not only when analyzing a single program, but also when multiple
alternatives are involved (with more expensive alternatives offering
greater potential payoffs). Boudreau's approach is relatively
simple and explicitly focuses on the decision context. Rather
than advocating improved measurement in all situations, Boudreau
proposed that one should first maximize the knowledge to be gained
from existing information (usually the quantity of employees
affected and the costs of the program) by estimating the critical
values for the unknown parameters, and then determining whether
further measurement effort is warranted. Because controversy
surrounded the accuracy and validity of SD estimates, Boudreau
-~
concentrated his analysis on that utility parameter, demonstrating
that the break-even SD values for the studies by Cascio and Silbey
-t
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(1979), and Schmidt, @t ale (1979) were substantially lower than
the expected SD value they derived.
-~
I applied break-even analysis to my more recent review of
empirical utility studies. This not only verified the conclusion
that selection program utility is uniformly high, but also shed
some light on the SD controversy. Without exception, the break-
-~
even SD values fell below 60% of the estimated SD value. In
-~ -~
many cases, the value necessary to break even was less than 1%
of the estimated value! In fact the break-even SD value exceeded
-~
20% of the estimated value in only 6 of the 41 analyses. The vast
majority of utility analysis applications concluded that the more-
valid selection device is worth the extra costs. Break-even
analysis supports this conclusion, suggesting that it could probably
have been reached without ever actually measuring SD (or at least
-~
by measuring it in the simplest and most conservative manner
possible). The break-even SDy values often fall several standard
deviations below the expected value. Sometimes (e.g., Rich &
Boudreau, 1987) the break-even SD value falls below the lowest
-~
value estimated by any of the subjects. Recent research
incorporating Boudreau's break-even analysis approach has reached
similar conclusions (e.g., Burke & Frederick, 1985; Cascio & Ramos,
1986; Eaton, Wing and Lau, 1985; Florin-Thuma & Boudreau, 1987;
Karren, NKomo, & Ramirez, 1985).
Algebraically deriving utility value variability. Recently,
statistical formulas for the variance of products of random
variables have been adapted to utility analysis. Goodman's (1960)
equations for the variance of the product of three or more random
variables under conditions of independence were adapted by Alexander
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and Barrick (1986) to produce a formula for the standard error
of utility values associated with a one-cohort selection utility
model. Algebraic derivation provides a variance estimate, but
it requires assumptions about the distribution shape (e.g.,
normality) to make strong probabilistic inferences. Existing
literature provides no empirical information supporting or refuting
the assumption of normality, but Hull (1980) noted that non-normal
distributions are likely when: (a) programs can be abandoned or
expanded during their life; (b) non-normal components heavily
influence the distribution; and (c) there is only a small number
of variables.
Monte Carlo analysis of utility value variability. Monte
Carlo analysis involves describing each utility model parameter
in terms of its expected value and distribution shape. In each
trial, a value for each utility parameter is "chosen" from the
distribution for that parameter, and the combination of chosen
parameter values is used to calculate the total utility value for
that trial. Repeated application of this choosing and calculating
procedure (using a computer) produces a sample of trials from which
the distribution properties of the utility values can be derived.
Thus, unlike the other three methods, simulations can vary many
parameters at once, can reflect dependencies among the parameters,
can acknowledge possible program expansion or abandonment, and
can reflect non-normal distribution assumptions.
Rich and Boudreau (1987) applied Monte Carlo analysis (and
compared it to each of the other three uncertainty estimation
methods) using an application of the Programmer Aptitude Test (PAT)
to select computer programmers in a mid-size computer manufacturer.
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They discovered that all of the utility parameters were subject
to some degree of uncertainty or variability over time. They also
discovered that SD variability heavily influenced the utility
-~
value distribution and that the distribution of SD values was
-~
positively skewed as in other studies (Bobko, et al., 1983; Burke
& Frederick, 1984; Schmidt, Mack & Hunter, 1984; Mathieu & Leonard,
1987) . Rich and Boudreau's (1987) findings suggested that the
distribution of utility values was greatly affected by the
assumptions about the SD distribution. They also found that the
-~
simulation suggested a greater amount of risk (variability) in
utility values than the algebraic derivation because the simulation
better reflected dependencies among utility parameters and parameter
relationships over time. However, break-even analysis, algebraic
derivation and Monte Carlo simulation all led to the same
conclusion: positive payoff from the selection program was very
likely.
Future Research Implications
Promising future research directions include integrating
selection utility with employee separations and job changes within
the organization, extending the payoff function to encompass
consequences other than productivity, and studying how selection
utility information affects decisions.
The External Employee Movement Utility Model
Boudreau and Berger (1985a, 1985b) suggested that there were
important analogies between employee acquisitions and employee
separations. Selection utility involves choosing a subset of
employees to join the workforce from a pool of applicants.
Retention utility involves "choosing" a subset of the previous-
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period's incumbent workforce to remain with the organization (though
retentions are more bilaterally chosen than acquisitions, the
analogy for utility purposes is still correct). The utility of
both acquisitions and retentions depends on the quantity of
employees affected (i.e., the number hired and the number retained),
on the quality of affected employees (i.e., the per-person, per-
time period effects of selection strategies; and the per-person,
per-time period effects of the retention pattern), and on the costs
incurred to implement or accommodate the movements (i.e., selection
device development/implementation costs and separation costs such
as severance pay, relocation assistance, etc.). Boudreau & Berger
(1985b, pp. 598-599) concluded that a utility analysis based only
upon selection consequences risks not only producing deficient
utility values, but also producing values that could lead to faulty
decision making. Their results also suggested that selection
utility models that ignore retention utility effects may
substantially overstate utility values (when less-valuable employees
are retained) or understate utility values (when more valuable
employees are retained).
Omitting retention utility considerations may severely bias
selection utility estimates. When improved selection causes the
retention pattern to become less optimal or when the retention
pattern is such that the value of improved selection is lost
quickly, selection utility values based on simpler models may lead
to incorrect decisions. This suggests that employee turnover
research and employee selection research should be integrated,
with both areas attending to the effects of the other. Moreover,
it suggests that studies of employee separations (e.g., "turnover")
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that focus only on the costs of separations or on the
characteristics of those who leave and stay (e.g., Cascio & McEvoy,
1985; Dalton, Krackhardt, & Porter, 1981; McEvoy & Cascio, 1985)
must be considered in light of the fact that they fail to consider
the effects of those acquired to replace the separations. Thus,
the external employee movement utility model provides the framework
for integrating and expanding selection utility research.
Integrating Selection with Internal Staffing
Selection programs that appear optimum for a single job may
have substantial consequences for internal movement. For example,
if improved selection for lower-level jobs also identifies skills
and abilities useful in upper-level jobs, then more-valid external
acquisition strategies may produce substantially higher benefits
than the simple selection utility model can recognize. Conversely,
if selection devices are targeted to skills exclusively applicable
to a lower-level job, but employees routinely move to upper-level
jobs using other skills, then maximizing lower-level job selection
utility may simultaneously reduce utility for the upper-level job.
These phenomena require an explicit framework integrating the
consequences of internal and external employee movement and
suggesting the variables likely to determine the utility of such
movements--a utility model for internal and external employee
movement.
Boudreau (1987) developed such a utility model. His utility
model draws upon the analogies between internal and external
employee movement. Specifically, Boudreau proposed that each
internal employee movement involves a separation from one
organizational job and an acquisition by another. Thus, the pattern
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of internal employee movement can be analyzed using the concepts
of selection and retention utility, but must recognize that both
types of utility are affected by the same movement. Boudreau's
results suggested that decisions based solely on an external
selection utility model (or even the external movement utility
model including acquisitions and separations/retentions) may produce
utility values leading to erroneous conclusions when internal
movement patterns offset the apparent positive effects of external
selection and retention, and vice versa. Future research should
adopt a broader perspective by incorporating internal movement
consequences into investigations of productivity-enhancement
interventions.
Using Selection utility analysis Models to Examine Actual Decision
Processes
While selection utility analysis results are often reported
as if they will influence decisions, enhance credibility, and
encourage a broader decision focus, existing research has ignored
these phenomena. Studies are needed to examine whether the results
of selection utility analysis actually affect managerial decisions,
whether decision maker's reactions to selection utility results
are affected by different estimation techniques, and whether
selection utility models accurately reflect the concerns of decision
makers. Florin-Thuma and Boudreau (in press) derived the utility
of a performance feedback intervention in a small organization,
asked decision makers to estimate the parameters of the utility
model, and to develop their own decision model. Decision makers
underestimated the magnitude of the performance problem and the
intervention's effect. Factors considered by decision makers but
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not included in the utility model (e.g., customer dissatisfaction)
argued against the intervention. However, when dollar values were
attached to these factors and when the decision maker's assumptions
were incorporated into the model, the utility results still
suggested substantial payoffs. Apparently, the decision makers
had failed to implement the performance feedback intervention
because they had simply never considered the performance problem
serious enough to warrant systematic consideration. Utility
analysis improved their awareness of the problem and their decision.
These results suggest research questions and methodologies
to more fully explore the effects of utility analysis on decisions.
Such research should draw on the substantial body of knowledge
regarding irrationality in decision making (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972, 1973; March & Simon, 1958). Selection utility
analysis models offer detailed frameworks for program analysis.
They are normative descriptions of the factors that decision makers
"should" consider in making selection decisions. However, Etzioni
(1986) has suggested that rational decision making must be induced
because it is contrary to natural inclinations. Selection utility
analysis may provide such inducements, but we must first understand
how actual decisions depart from selection utility analysis
prescriptions, and focus our efforts to induce more rational
decision making. Research linking selection utility analysis to
actual decisions may discover how selection utility analysis models
can be enhanced by better reflecting actual decision considerations.
Selection utility analysis offers vast research potential.
Moreover, the results of such research are likely to have very
important implications for the ways Human Resource managers (and
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those who assist them) apply findings from industrial psychology
and other social sciences. Future research should emphasize the
decisions supported by utility analysis, should incorporate economic
information into utility analysis, should adopt a broader and more
integrative perspective regarding multiple interventions, and should
attend more closely to the effects of utility analysis on managerial
decisions. With attention to the research questions noted above,
researchers and decision makers will produce decision tools that
truly reflect a partnership between applied social science research
and managerial decisions regarding human work behavior.
the utility of human resource productivity improvement
programs. Personnel Psychology, 36, 551-557.
Boudreau, J. W. (1983b). Effects of employee flows on utility
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